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A COMMON SENSE
AND
POINT OF VIEW
E. M. Dadlez

hen philosophical discourse turns at once to Kant
and Hume, it is typically contrastive, more a delinea
tion of differences than a full comparison. Most
often, they are presented as antagonists whose positions are such that
the acceptance of one philosopher's claims is held to preclude adoption
of the other's. In ethics, notoriously, we are inclined to take sides and
muster our intuitions under a single banner, identifying our adversaries
by their allegiance to the rival camp. It is not my intention to dispute
the distinctions which motivate this polarization, but only to indicate
that their prominence can lead us to lose sight of less conspicuous
commonalities. Clearly, there is enormous divergence between the
projects and presuppositions of Kant and Hume, but there remains a
certain quantity of common ground.
My particular interest centers on the similarities between Kant's
analysis of the beautiful and Hume's conception of the good. Kantian
judgments of taste and Humean moral judgments are both distin
guished by a subjectivity that eschews relativism in virtue of a common
sense or common point of view which negotiates a middle ground
between subjective and objective judgment. Both Kant's aesthetic
response and Hume's moral sentiment are responses of feeling upon
the disinterested contemplation of an object.Both accounts presuppose
in human nature a capacity for experiencing the relevant subjective
state. Both impose criteria of impartiality for justification, though these
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dearly differ in scope.
Hume insists on the significance of feeling for moral and aesthetic
evaluation,' and even Kant acknowledges that it is feelingwhich bridges
the gap between our apprehension of the beautiful and of the good. As
Paul Guyer has pointed out, Kant maintains that "the beautiful 'is
purposive in relation to the moral feeling' becauseit 'prepares us to love
something, even nature, apart from interest' {CJ 29)."^ It is no part of
the purpose of this paper to inquire into connections between Kant's
aesthetics and his ethics, an investigation which philosophers better
equipped to execute the project have already undertaken. Instead, I
propose to consider several more readily discernable parallels between
Kant's approach to taste and Hume's examination of morality. In brief,
I wish to explore such similarities, to consider whether our understand
ing of one philosopher's contentions can offer a new perspective on the
other's, and to suggest that, when it comes to certain forms of valuing,
the two are not entirely at odds.^
For Kant, the judgment of taste is subjective rather than objective
in that its determining ground refers to the feelings of the subject: "If
we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do not refer
the representation of it to the Object by means of understanding with
a view to cognition, but by means of the imagination.. .we refer the
representation to the Subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure"
(CJ 1). When we judge a thing beautiful, we do not do so because we
have identified some readily specifiable and determinate character it
possesses, but insofar as the contemplation of its form gives us
immediate delight. We cannot, Rob van Gerwen indicates, prove a
thing's beauty from its properties.'*So taste is the faculty of assessing an
object by means of disinterested delight or aversion {CJ 5). There is a
necessary connection between beauty and a particular kind of pleasure
that Kant refers to as "free" {CJ 5), a pleasure unmediated by private

' Connections between Humean ethicsand aesthetics have most recently been drawnby Elizabeth
Neill, "Hume's Moral Sublime," British Journal of Aesthetics 37 (1997); 246-58.
^ Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Ereedom: Essays on Aesthetics and MoraH^ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 35.
' All parenthetical references cite: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (Q), excerpted in Kant's
Critique of AestheticJudgment, Junes Meredith, translator, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911); David
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (7), (New York: Prometheus, 1992).
* Rob van Gerwen, "Kant's Regulative Principle of Aesthetic Excellence: The Ideal Aesthetic
Experience," Kant Studien 86 (1995): 333.

A Common Sense and Point of View

79

interests and inclinations. Disinterestedness can be seen as a criterion
by means of which feelings of pleasure may be held to have the
requisite status for justifying a judgment of taste.'
Hume's moral judgments exhibit a similar connection between
pleasure or pain and the dimension of evaluation.® Granted, the
concepts of pleasure and pain as they are deployed in the Treatise of
Human Nature cannot be disinterested in any fully Kantian sense. They
are motivating in a way that Kant explicitly rejects in his comparison of
aesthetic pleasure with other forms of delight that can be aligned with
desires {CJ 5), for Hume describes pleasure as "the chief spring or
actuating principle of the human mind" (T, 3.3.1). Nevertheless,
Humean moral responses have a structure that is not entirely dissimilar
to responses Kant describes as aesthetic. Hume's moral judgments are
not derived from reason, but from sentiment. Hume says that morality
is more properly felt than judged of, and that "the distinguishing
impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but
particular pains and pleasures" (T 3.1.2). Having a sense of someone's
virtue is feeling a satisfaction of a particular kind (T 3.1.2), for senti
ments of love and approval are always agreeable or accompanied by
pleasure, and those of hatred and disapproval are always uneasy or
accompanied by pain (T 2.2.1).
It is sentiment that designates a character good or evil, a sentiment
whose genesis involves our disinterested contemplation of another
thinking being (T 3.1.2). Hume acknowledges that it may be difficult to
distinguish between a distinctively moral approbation and an approba
tion informed by private interests (T 3.1.2). This is retniniscent of
Kant's concern to emphasize thedistinction between free and interested
pleasures (CJ 5). Such discriminations are especially difficult for Hume
in view of the fact that moral and interested approbation (or disappro
bation) can coincide. Nonetheless, there are several passages (especially
T 3.1.2, 3.3.1) in which Hume emphasizes the adoption of a disinter
ested point of vantage. It appears, therefore, that both Kantian taste

' Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims ofTaste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 168.
' So do Hume's judgments of taste, as described in "Of the Standard of Taste" and the Tnatise,
but these are not at issue here. For a comparison of Humean and Kantian aesthetics, see Anthony
Savile, Kantian Aesthetics Punued (Edinbur^: Edinburg)i University Press, 1993), 64-86. See also
George Dickie, The Centuty tf Taste: The Philosifhical Oc^ssy of Taste in the Eighteenth Centuty (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85-141,149-51.1 believe a case might be madefor a closer
resemblance between Hume's ethics and Kant's aesthetics.
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and Humean morality afford distinctions which are determined by
feelings deriving from disinterested contemplation. Further consider
ations pertaining to Kant's and Hume's accounts of interest will be
addressed in later passages.
As is evident from the preceding discussion, both Hume and Kant
relegate the understanding to a subsidiary position in their respective
accounts. According to Kant, the judgment of taste is not a cognitive
one; it is aesthetic rather than logical. Pleasure and pain are said to
constitute the basis of a form of discrimination or assessment distinct
from those affihated with knowledge (CJ1). In an experience of beauty,
the manifold of intuition is unified, as in cases associated with other
forms of judgment, but this is achieved without the imposition of a
concept (specifically regarding beauty) by the understanding: "The
cognitive powers are here engaged in free play, since no definite
concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition" (CJ 9). In this
context, the imagination is free because it does not operate according
to the dictates of the understanding. The understanding is free because
it need not operate exclusively in service of the truth.^ Kant describes
this free play of the imagination and understanding as "a thing only
capable of being felt" (CJ 15), a contention reminiscent of Hume's
claim that the moral is more properly felt than judged of. Any role the
understanding plays does not involve cognixing the object, for there is
no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for beauty that can be
Hnked to the object exclusive of the agent. The harmony of the faculties
(sans concept) specifically tied to aesthetic delight cannot be negotiated
by an apprehension or recognition of some conceptually distinguishable
feature of the world. Rather, Kant suggests that the foundation of the
judgment of taste is its very mode of representation (CJ 11—12).
On this, beauty can be associated with a way in which something
can be represented to us, instead of being held to reside entirely in the
content of the representation. We tend to speak, of course, as if beauty
were a wholly objective property which things could be said to possess
or lack. This may be due to the resemblance between judgments of taste
and those judgments whose determining ground is objective rather than
subjective. In these other cases, the representation by means of which
an object is given to cognition requires the imagination to gather

' Maty A. McQoskey, Kant's Aesthetic (London; MacMiUan, 1987), 70-71.
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together the manifold of intuition and requires the understanding to
unite representations under a concept. As indicated, this unity (and the
harmony of imagination and understandingcontingent on it) is achieved
in aesthetic judgment without the subsumption of the manifold under
a specific concept. If beauty is often treated as an objective property of
things, it may be as a result of this resemblance.
The foregoing assigns a subordinate role to the understanding in
aesthetic evaluation, something that is also apparent in Hume's account
of morality. Clearly, the latter differs from Kant's analysis of taste when
it comes to the question of valuing in light of certain ends. The
similarities are nonetheless readily apparent when we consider the
restricted moral arena in which Hume permits the understanding to play
some part. For Hume, morality is practical, and sentiment regulates
conduct in a way that reason cannot Reason only judges facts and
relations amongideas. Morality consists neither in such relations nor in
such matters of fact as reveal themselves to the understanding (T3.1.1).
We can, for instance, discover turpitude "before reason" and independ
ent of its decisions (T3.1.1). Virtue and vice are said to be discoverable
by the sentiments to which they give rise (T3.1.2). Indeed, virtue and
vice are at one point described as perceptions in the mind rather than
qualities of the object (T3.1.1).
Yet just as Kant would not permit any direct inference from
pleasure to beauty and would hold that something is not judged
beautiful simply because it pleases (CJ11), Hume indicates that "we do
not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases. But in feeling that
it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is
virmous" (T3.1.2). Just as Kant tells us there is.an inclination to treat
beauty as an objective property because aesthetic judgments share
conditions with logical judgments, so Hume's account suggests that
morality may be regarded by some as an entirely objective matter
because a moral sentiment is often so "gende that we are apt to
confound it with an idea" (T 3.1.2).
The understanding still has a function here, as it does in Kant's
account of the beautiful. For Hume, any causal story about the indirect
passions involves ideas, and the indirect passions are allied or identified
with the moral sentiments in many parts of the Treatise. Hume states
that the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are
"nothing but fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred" (T 3.3.5)
and is often taken to regard approval and disapproval as impartial
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variants of the indirect passions.® The preceding is significant because
the indirect passions of love and hatred, themselves impressions of
reflection,' are said to be caused by an idea about a positive or negative
quality in something (the subject) associated with an agent (the object).
Initially, this might seem to be at odds with Hume's claim that morality
springs from sentiment. If moral disapproval is a species of hatred, then
it would seem to spring from an idea, perhaps characterizable as a belief
or judgment, in which case reason would take precedence over
sentiment. However, such a conclusion is not inevitable. For instance,
we need acknowledge no inconsistency if talk of causation is taken to
convey claims about conceptual necessity rather than temporal
precedence.
It could be further suggested that two distinct ideas are at issue.
Hume urges us to "make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object
of.. .passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which
they direct their view, when excited" (T2.1.2). It is only the latter idea
which concerns the object of the passion, that is, what it is at or of or for.
In the case of love and hatred, this is another person: the individual to
whom virtue or vice is ascribed. In contrast, the initial idea, which is
said to cause the passion, concerns a positive or negative quality in
something affiliated with the individual toward whom the emotion is
directed. This initial idea excites the passion, from which proceeds the
judgment concerning the person.
It is possible that this initial idea could be regarded as a belief or
thought concerning a matter of fact, for instance that some particular
course of action or decision (the subject) performed by a given
individual (the object) is such as to inflict pain and suffering (the
quality). To give a more specific example, consider the belief that the
denial of tenure to a hardworking faculty member of Einstein-like
brilliance will cause pain to the students and faculty no longer able to
bask in its glow, and give pain to the faculty member as well, who will
go into a decline when contemplating a future filled with APA inter
views. Such a belief could produce indignation or disapproval, which

' For example, by Walter Brand, Humt's Thioty of Moral Jadffiie/ii: A Stu^ in the Unity of A Treatise
of Human Nature (Dordrecht; Kluwer, 199^, 69. The treatment of approval and disapproval as
species of indirect passion was suggested earlier by Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 1989), 114.
' R. W Altman, "Hume on Sympathy," SouthernJournal of Philosoply IS (1980): 126.
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could in turn give rise to some negative evaluation about the object of
the disapproval, for example, the belief that members of the tenure
committee are immoral scum who deserve to be consigned to a hell in
which hostile and contemptuous interviewers perpetually quiz them
about different interpretations of Kant's second analogy.
Here, the sentiment of disapproval is the progenitor of the
specifically moral judgment, while the idea or belief said to cause that
sentiment is not evaluative in this way. This preserves Hume's causal
story while eliminating the charge ofinconsistency, since theidea which
produces the passion is not normative, and the normative appraisal still
springs from sentiment. Thus, to return to the subject which gave rise
to these speculations, the understanding remains subordinate to
sentiment in moral response.
Hume might also give reason a part to play in the adjudication of
moral disputes, but this would involve getting clear on matters of fact,
where different beliefs concerning the facts would give rise to different
sentiments. Did the faculty member act in accord with her job descrip
tion? Was she published? How were her papers received? Were students
and faculty pained by the possibility of her departure, or were they
thrown into paroxysms of ecstasy during the course of its contempla
tion? That is, in the case of my example, we might setde disputes about
whether the denial of tenure was unfair by calling into question beliefs
about the facts, not beliefs which incorporated evaluations. The moral
belief would once again spring from sentiment, perhaps from a changed
sentiment in response to a fuller awareness of the facts. However, the
factual belief, independent of sentiment, could not by itself provide a
motive for action (such as the action of filing a grievance on behalf of
the faculty member). Morality, as was the case with beauty, is not
principally associated with the understanding.
Despite the subjective foundations of Kantian judgments of taste
and Humean moral judgments, neither philosopher concedes that his
account falls prey to relativism. Neither beauty nor morality are
regarded as radically subjective. They are, rather, iw/frsubjective, in that
they arise from the very faculties upon which much of human experi
encing is contingent.
For Kant, the aesthetic experience has universal, though subjective,
grounds. Judgments of taste are intersubjectively valid; they do not
exhibit the radical subjectivism that would relativize them entirely to
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individual subjects and so undermine claims to validity.'" Guyer
maintains that judgments of taste are arrived at by reflection on one's
own mental states. The attribution of a feeling of pleasure to the
harmony of the faculties is what "licenses the attribution of the pleasure
to other persons, or a claim of intersubjective validity for the
pleasure."" The harmony between the imagination and understanding
(associated with the unification of the manifold of intuition) is necessary
for all cognition, and this harmony is characteristic of aesthetic as well
as logical judgments. "The result is that the judgment of taste, with its
attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest, must involve
a claim of validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality
attached to objects, that is, there must be coupled with it a claim to
subjective universality" {CJ 6). Subjective universal validity, unlike
objective validity, must "be of a special kind, seeing that it does not join
the predicate of beauty to the concept of the Object taken in its entire
logical sphere, and yet does extend this predicate over the whole sphere
of judging Subject^' (CJ 8). Judgments of taste are held to postulate a
universal voice in respect of a delight that is unmediated by concepts
(CJ 8). Just as the harmony of the faculties which attends the represen
tation of an object in logical judgments admits of universal communicability (CJ 9), so the free play and harmony of the faculties in aesthetic
judgment admit of universal communicability or imputability, in this
case of the mental state constitutive of such free play.
In making a judgment of taste, we are said to presuppose a
"Common Sense," a capacity for apprehending things in a particular
way that is common to us all." This is introduced as a principle of
universal communicability that explains the "ought" in aesthetic
judgments, the demand for agreement, though this demand cannot be
characterized as some personally issued imperative. Not every claim
concerning beauty will be correct (as, for example, when a judgment is
not properly disinterested). Rather, the demand for agreement is the

"See, for example,Salim Kemal, KaiU andFine Art:An Essiff on Kant and the PhUos^hy of Fine Art
and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 165.
" Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 8.
There are, of course, competing interpretations, since the phrase is often believed to have
different senses in different contexts, and there is much disagreement about whether Kant's
common sense is a feeling or a capacity to have one. For arguments in support of the latter
interpretation, see Donald W Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory (Wisconsin: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1974), 128—30.
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demand that all judgments concerning beauty ought to be acceded to
when correct." The claim to the assent of others is compared by Mary
McCloskey to that inherent in single empirical assertions. These make
a claim to the assent of others, but this is only a claim with which others
should concur if the observation in question has it right." The common
sense is "a subjective principle...which determines what pleases and
displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet
with universal validity" (CJ 20). As Anthony Savile puts it, without "a
common susceptibility to respond to the same objects in the same
ways," we could not make sense of the "ought" in aesthetic
judgments." Whether a common sense in fact exists as a constitutive
principle of the possibility of experience, whether taste "is a natural and
original faculty," is something that is left tantali2ingly undetermined (CJ
22).
Hume also speaks of a shared susceptibility. Our minds are similar
"in feelings and operations," and the susceptibility of a single person to
a given sentiment in given circumstances implies a like susceptibility in
others (T3.3.1). He maintains that moral sentiments "are so rooted in
our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the
human mind by disease or madness, 'tis impossible to extirpate or
destroy them" (T3.1.2)." In particular, sympathy is described as "a very
powerful principle in human nature" that is "the chief source of moral
distinctions" (T 3.3.6). It is not a particular passion, but is held to
account for our capacity to share the feelings of others, as well as our
concern for the good of humanity in general. Hume's description of the
sympathetic reaction is as follows; "When I see the effects of a passion in
the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from
these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion
as is presently converted into the passion itself (T 3.3.1).
We cannot experience the emotions of others in any direct,
unmediated way. We can, however, take note of their circumstances and

" McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic, 53.
" McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic, 53.
" Savile, Kantian Aesthetics Pursued, 34-35.
" It is interesting to note the relevance of this passage to current invesugadons in ethics. The
inability to empathi2e (a capacity not unrelated to Humean sympathy, a concept central to his
account of morality in the Treatise) has recently been linked to mental illness and even
psychopathic behavior, forexample, byJohn Deigh,"Empathy and Universalizability," Ethics105
(1995); 743-63.
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condition, as well as their behavior (the causes and effects of the
passion). On this basis we can make inferences which enable us to draw
conclusions about the agent's probable mental state. Such inferences,
Hume indicates, can give rise to our sympathy, to the experience of the
mental state concerning which our inferences have led us to form an
idea (T3.3.1).
How does the transition from the lively idea of a passion to the
passion itself (an impression) take place? Hume indicates that the idea
or impression of ourselves is always present to us, and that it imparts
"vivacity" to ideas of objects related to ourselves (T 2.3.6, 2.1.11).
These ideas can then be converted to impressions, presumably because
of the enlivening impact of the idea or impression of the self. The
contention that there is an impression of the self might be thought
entirely at odds with the denial that there can be any such impression
in Book I of the Treatise. Pall Ardal and Annette Baier address this
difficulty. They point out that Hume's discussion of personal identity
in Book I involves the contention that there is no uniform and
unchanging impression of the self that is stable over time. In contrast.
Book II of the Treatise could be taken to refer not to such a self, but to
a complex of impressions taken to constitute a self at some particular
moment" Douglas Chismar suggests that the impressions comprising
the idea or impression of the self to which Hume refers could be
memories of our own past experiences, resuscitated by our observation
of another's similar experience.'® This would appear to defuse the
charge of inconsistency, but does not answer the initial question, even
if relations of resemblance among human beings in general are taken
into account.
How does an impression of the self effect the transformation of an
idea of a passion into the passion itself? Hume says that "our conscious
ness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not
possible to imagine that any thing can in this particular go beyond it.
Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived
with a like vivacity of conception" (T 2.1.11). It is very tempting to
surest that the role of the impression of the self in this particular

" Ardal, Passion and Value, 44-45. Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's
Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 129-31.
" Douglas Chismar, "Hume's Confiision about Sympathy," Pbilosoply Research Archives 14
(1988-89): 239.
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context is one that can be associated with the imaginative adoption of
a first-person perspective, a perspective that "enlivens" ideas of another
agent's experience by imaginatively laying claim to it insofar as it does
or could resemble one's own.
I should make it clear at the outset that Ardal, as well as other
philosophers, opposes any such interpretation, indicating that the
Treatise contains no suggestion of the approach taken by Adam Smith:
that of imaginatively putting oneself in another's place." However,
Hume never explicitly rejects this move. Indeed, an anonymous review
of Smith's work, quite convincingly attributed to Hume, calls Smith's
sympathy mechanism "very natural and probable."^" This at the very
least suggests an acceptance of Smith's approach as a likely analysis of
what may be involved when an idea is transformed into an impression,
rather than demonstrating some variety of concession to a rival theory.
That is, Hume may have regarded some part of Smith's account^' in the
light of an expansion, and not a correction. It might even be argued
that such an interpretation captures both the significance of references
to an idea or impression of the self and the real, connection between
sympathy and what Hume calls the common point of view, permitting
us to see sympathy as a capacity which facilitates the adoption of points
of vantage dissociated from our purely personal interests and concerns.
I therefore speculate that the inferential process constituting the
first stage of a s)rmpathetic response can culminate in the experience of
an indirect passion when one contemplates the circumstances of the
agent from a first-person perspective, and imagines them from that
agent's point of vantage. The passion can be shared because its causes
are shared in imagination. This capacity to experience vicariously the
emotion of another and to enter into a perspective on the world other
than one's own naturally accounts for our pleasure in the pleasure of
others and our pain in their pain (for example, T 2.2.5, 2.2.9).^
" For example, see Ardal, Passion and Value, 45.
® David R. Raynor, "Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's Theoij tfMoralSentiments" Journal of the
History of Philosophy 22 (1984); 67.
" Hume did not, of course, concur with every aspect of the account of sympathy put forward by
Smith. This is evident in a letter in which Hume urged Smith to explain or modify his
characterization of sympathy as invincibly agreeable, given the possibility of sympathizing with
disagreeable emotions. The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1932), 313.
" The inversion of this—^pain in others' pleasure and pleasure in their pain—^is associated with
Hume's principle of comparison, a source of malice and envy, and has been explicidy identified
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Entry into the pleasures, pains, and interests of others is accom
plished by means of the imagination (for example, T 2.2.5), so the
imagination plays a part in Hume's picture of morality, as it does in the
Kantian apprehension of beauty. In view of their different theories of
the imagination, however, the significance of this is questionable. More
interesting is the stress each places on communicability. Hume believes
that the beliefs and passions of others clearly influence us. This
influence "proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication,
and sympathy...is...the conversion of an idea into an impression by
force of the imagination" (T 2.3.6). I would also associate this force
with the impression of the self said earlier to effect the same transfor
mation; The imagination could thus be taken to alter the ivaj thoughts
were entertained, to effect a transition from a third- to a first-person
perspective. Thus, our experiences could be shareable and communica
ble in virtue of a shared constitution and shared capacities.
For Hume, our pleasure in that of others, and our pain in their
pain, involves not only present pains and pleasures, but hypothetical
ones: "sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but...we
often feel.. .the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being,
and which we only anticipate by force of imagination" (T2.2.9). Indeed,
when someone's misery strongly affects me, "the vivacity of the
conception is not confined merely to its immediate object, but diffuses
its influence.. .and gives me a lively notion of all the circumstances of
that person, whether past, present, or future" (T2.2.9). To s)nnpathize
can be to make general rather than immediate concerns of others our
own, to participate in those concerns. Sympathy, therefore, does not
require that the experiences with which we can be said to sympathize
actually exist. We can "take part" in emotions and experiences that are
not in fact felt or had by someone else, but that we believe muldhQ felt
or had in one set of circumstances or another.
Consider that we can discover by means of experience that certain
emotions typically accompany certain changes in one's circumstances
or one's behavior. Even when we encounter an anomalous case in
which the conjunction does not obtain and the passion is absent in the
person we observe, Hume states that "the imagination is affected by a
general rule, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion itself.. .as
with moral evil, forexample, by Colin McGinn in Ethics,Evil and Fiction (Oxford:Clarendon Press,
1997), 61-91.
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if the person were really actuated by it. From the same principles we
blush for the conduct of those, who behave.. .foolishly before us; and
that tho' they show no sense of shame" (T 2.2.7). Given the passages
from the Trva^isewhich have been cited, the aforementioned general rule
would presumably involve the kind of inference Hume says that we
make in order to form an idea of the passion of another. That is, one
considers what would he experienced by someone placed as the subject
is placed and behaving as the subject behaves. It would appear that a
common point of view could be negotiated by means of such infer
ences.
Naturally, there are variations in our sentiments "according to our
situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blamed
or praised, and according to the present disposition of our mind. But
these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply
the terms expressive of our liking or dislike.. .as if we remained in one
point of view" (T 3.3.1). Hume calls this a "correcting" of sentiments,
a correction of the momentary appearances of things accomplished by
considering how we would react, were we less remote, less distracted,
less interested, or differendy situated (T 3.3.1). CommunicabiUty
requires the capacity to "overlook our present situation," just as we
automatically discount common sensory illusions (T 3.3.1). To feel a
distinctively moral sentiment is to preserve oneself from the biases to
which our private concerns make us subject, and to contemplate an
object or character "in general, without reference to our particular
interest" (T 3.1.2). The possibility of communication depends on our
taking into account the variability of appearances: "'tis impossible we
could ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us
to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his
peculiar point of view" (T 3.3.1). We would not, Hume could be taken
to suggest, be able to communicate our sentiments without the
adoption of some intersubjective standard of usage or steady and
general point of view that went beyond an exclusively personal
perspective on the world.
The above mentioned general decisions and judgments thus
involve disregarding one's own situation and interests when they are
directly involved in that to which one responds. We abstract from our
present situation and attempt to enter into that of the individual with
whom we sympathize, an individual whose natural desire to promote
her own advantage is echoed by our similar desire to further our own
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ends and is therefore fully comprehensible to us when her perspective
is adopted (T3.3.1). M. Jamie Ferreira points out that Hume's approach
does justice both to sameness and difference.^ It is said to transcend
the private and particular while leaving us unencixmbered by concep
tions of an abridged and disembodied prototypical human being. "We
are all so constituted," says Ferreira, "as to be able to comprehend
humans who are different from us in particular ways—^ways which we
can appreciate because however different from our actual experience
they are ways humans can be and so cannot be ultimately alien."^"*
Hume indicates that "Every particular person's pleasure and
interest being different, 'tis impossible men. could ever agree in their
sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of
view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause
it to appear the same to all of them" (T3.3.1). For instance, in the moral
evaluation of a person's character, the only point of vantage that can be
shared by everyone is that which is internal to the individual who is the
object of assessment (or the perspective of those closely connected with
the person) and with whom all have the capacity to sympathize. Each
participant can adopt a perspective on the world informed by the
circumstances and situation of that person or his/her peers, and from
that point of vantage be aware of those individuals' interests, pleasures,
and anxieties. Though any sentiments felt as the result of such an
exercise are likely to be less intense than those affiliated with interests
of our own, "yet being more constant and universal, they counter
balance the latter even in practice,and are alone admitted in speculation
as the standard of morality" (T3.3.1). Of course, what is sympathized
with (hypothetical or actual experiences) is not what is approved or
disapproved. The objects of our approval or disapproval are people, the
disinterested contemplation of whose character (and its impact on
others) sympathy facilitates.
This common point of view involves abstraction from one's own
particular interests, much as Kant's judgment of taste does. It is the
detachment from purely private concerns which permits not only a
universal shareabiUty and communicability, but the demand for
agreement. It should be noted that, in Book III of the Treatise, Hume

"M.Jamie Ferreira, "Hume and Imagination: Sympathy and the "Other"," IntemationalPhilosoplncal
J2»arte/^34(1954): 55.
" Ferreira, "Hume and Imagination," 55.
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need not be taken to claim categorically that a»j/ transition from "is" to
"ought" is impossible (T3.1.1). For instance, Annette Baier maintains
that Hume, in discussing transitions from "is" to "ought," thinks that
they require more of an explanation than a leap of faith from divine
commands to 'ought' can provide. He is said to use the rationalists' own
rules against them, but not to share "their view that the only good
inferences are demonstrations, so it is still open to him to move from
is to 'should,' and to give a carefully explained account of a transition
from facts about human agreements or conventions to conclusions
about our 'natural obligations.'"^^ Hume, of course, does not predict
universal agreement any more than does Kant, but points to the ready
availability of corrective procedures of abstraction that are not wholly
unlike Kantian stipulations concerning disinterestedness.
It is important to note the distinction between aesthetic or moral
response and judgment here. Judgments concerning ascriptions of
beauty or virtue can be mistaken on several counts. Hume notes the
difficulty in discriminating between interested and moral approba
tion—frequently a difficulty in detachment from private concerns. Kant
distinguishes among pleasures in terms of their sources, pointing out
that pleasure in the beautiful is distinct from pleasure in the agreeable
or in the instrumentally or morally good (CJ 5). He allies this distinction
with interest, associating aesthetic response with pleasure experienced
in the absence of interests, a pleasure in the mere contemplation of an
object, in "that which I make out of this representation in myself {CJ
2). How we are to define "interest" in this context is the subject of
debate, as is the question of whether a response wholly free of any
connection to interest is possible and that of whether a "pure"
judgment of taste ought merely to be regarded as a limiting case. Paul
Guyer imports the definition of "interest" employed in the second
Critique into his interpretation of these passages, insisting that interest
cannot be equated with some species of pleasure. Instead, he contends
that interests involve mental states which provide motives for action by
means of conceptual ascriptions.^® This would rule out as interested
cases in which beauty was predicated of an object in virtue of some
conceptually distinguishable feature.^' This less global definition

^ Baier, A Profftss ofSentiments, 177.
" Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 183.
" Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 189.
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provides an account of the distinction between aesthetic pleasure and
pleasures in the agreeable and the good. The latter require some
"further penetration into the causal nexus of the object—either
cognitively, by judgment about its causal history or causal potential, or
practically, either by consumption, use, or possession, or by judgment
about such relations."^®
One is justified in considering reflective pleasure in an object
universally communicable and imputable provided no mistake has been
made "in attributing a particular feeling of pleasure to harmony of the
faculties"—that is, provided that one does not "take the matter for the
form or the charm for the beauty."^' The pleasures of, for example,
beauty and charm, are not phenomenologically distinct, but distinct in
their origins. We do not recognize an aesthetic pleasure because it is a
feeling distinct from all other pleasures, but insofar as we recognize its
source in ourselves. An aesthetic response depends on the harmony of
the faculties in free play; an aesthetic judgment depends on recognizing
it—on getting ourselves right.
On this reading of Kant, any attempt to ascertain the presence or
absence of interest in connection with one's pleasure is "a matter not
of incorrigible introspection, but of hypothesis and conjecture about
causal connections in one's mental history."^" While Humean require
ments pertaining to disinterest cannot entirely exclude the causal and
practical considerations that Kant's do, they exhibit a similar focus on
detachment from purely personal concerns and a similar reliance on our
capacity to distinguish among our likings by taking into account the
interests and other concerns which may inform them.
Hume's talk of illusion suggests that our own interests can delude.
He acknowledges that "those sentiments, from interest and morals, are
apt to be confounded....but...a man of temper and judgment may
preserve himself from these illusions" (T3.1.2). That neither account
affords certainty in judgment is unsurprising, given the possibility of
error in the case of other, conceptually guided, judgments.
The Humean conception of interest presendy under discussion is
far narrower than that employed by Kant, for Hume's common point
of view involves only detachment from concerns unique to our

" Gxyjct, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 195.
Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 318.
^ Guyer, Kant and the Claims ifTasU, 205.
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particular situation insofar as that situation informs our perspective on
what it is we contemplate. The Kantian conception is broader, but
coincides with Hume's where these types of interests are involved.
Guyer cites Kant's Reflexionen to clarify one of the sorts of "interests in
existence" at issue for Kant: "the beautiful must betray no alien interest,
but please apart from any self-interest. It is not to betray any affection
for art, any pride in wealth, any charm in the acquisition of goods, any
need for economy. It must please in itself, like virtue."^' Hume shows
a similar attention to such a detached point of vantage. The fortifica
tions of a city may be admired on account of their strength even if they
belong to an enemy and we desire their destruction, for "the imagina
tion adheres to the
views of things, and distinguishes the feelings
they produce, from those which arise from our particular and momen
tary situation" (T3.3.1). We may derive satisfaction by contemplating
the advantages of a city's fortifications because of sympathy with its
inhabitants, even if they are hated enemies (T 2.3.10).
In a Kantian aesthetic judgment, faculties like one's own are
presupposed in others, as is their capacity for harmonious free play. It
is assumed that others are like oneself in constitution and capacity, and
this assumption does not principally rely on previous instances of
concurrence.'^ The claim that judgments of taste can be intersubjectively vahd derives support from the intersubjective validity of other
cognitive judgments in which the harmony of imagination and under
standing obtains. Hume also appeals to shared faculties and capacities
which can permit the adoption of a shared point of vantage and shared
response. For Kant, given that an agent's aesthetic delight is not based
on interests or inclinations of his own—^is, in effect, abstracted from
them—there are no purely personal conditions which constrain that
agent's judgment. "Hence he must regard it as resting on what he may
also presuppose in every other person; and therefore he must believe
that he has reason for demaning a similar delight from everyone.
Accordingly, he will speak of the beautiful as if it were a quality of the
object" {C] 6). Sympathy, for Hume, involves a like departure from a
point of vantage on the world informed exclusively by private interests
and concerns. It can be the adoption of a shared and shareable
perspective that permits us to speak of a common standard of morality.
" Immanuel Kant, ?jflexion 827, Ak. 15. Cited in Guyer, Kant and the CUms of Taste, 196.
" Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 8.
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Kant appears to offer a procedure for rectifying taste distinct from
the criterion for justification of judgments discussed above. Taste may
be rectified by means of its very exercise, by sharpening the judgment
"upon particular examples which function as model or paradigm cases
of beautiful things."^' The disagreement of others may lead one to
doubt whether one's taste has been formed "on a knowledge of a
sufficient number of objects of a certain kind" (CJ 33), but cannot prove
one's judgment mistaken. While a judgment of taste is always singular,
repeated exposure to examples can sensitize the faculties and develop
taste.
It may be worth noting by way of comparison that, although Hume
does not make this point explicitly, the use of examples (in particular,
counterexamples) in disputes about ethical theories frequently involves
an appeal to sentiment rather than principle. Consider that rival
theoreticians often aver that application of their opponents' ethical
system or principle would sanction some action or conduct regarded
and presented as obviously wrong (for example, "you'd have to hand
your family over to the Nazis because it was impermissible to lie in
order to save them"). This "obvious" wrongness cannot be determined
by an appeal to the critic's own theory without begging the question,
and is clearly not deemed impermissible by that of the rival. The
wrongness must be pre-theoretical, must involve examples of actions
or conduct to which we react as wrong. Thus, I think that a case may be
made for appeals to sentiment in the adjudication of certain kinds of
theoretical disputes that rely on the presentation of particular cases and
examples. Hume's own stress on the principle of resemblance as a
relation among ideas (T 1.1.4) might even surest a role for paradigm
cases that involves their association with and influence on responses of
approval or disapproval. This may be reinforced by the possibility that
the impression of the self taken to enliven the idea of the passion of
another is understood to incorporate recollections of those of one's
experiences and reactions which resemble the experiences and reactions
of the agent upon whom attention is focused.
There still remain questions concerning what it is to which or on
account of which we will respond with aesthetic delight or moral
sentiment. For Kant, a pure judgment of taste is one whose determining

" McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetic, 72-73.
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ground is finality of form (CJ13). The objects of aesthetic judgments
are said to be characterized by a formal purposiveness that is without
purpose. This involves, according to Guyer, a perception of objects as
if they were the products of design "even in the absence of a theoretical
assertion that they are."''* Beauty is ascribed to an object on account of
its form: "In painting, sculpture, and.. .all the formative arts.. .the design
is what is essential. Here it is...what pleases by its form, that is the
fundamental prerequisite for taste.... AU form of objects of sense.. .is
figure orplaj. In the latter case it is either play of figures...in
space.. .or mere play of sensations.. .in time... .the design in the former
and the composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure
judgment of taste" [C] 14). Kant is not speaking here of a determinate
property whose instantiation may be ascertained by the application of
set criteria. There is no single determinate arrangement of shapes,
pattern or arrangement of volumes, sequence of notes, that gives rise
to (or, indeed, that guarantees) aesthetic pleasure. Salim Kemal indicates
of the claim that an object is beautiful that it "cannot be inferred or
deduced from any general quality of the object: no general rule
apphcable to the latter relates it to our individual experiences of
pleasure in beauty."'^ The imagination and understanding are in free
play and no concept organizes the manifold of intuition.
The important distinction in the passage cited above is between the
form and matter of sensation, where the matter of sensation is regarded
as private and associated with secondary qualities like color,^^ while its
form is regarded as public and interpersonally accessible. Form is a
spatial or temporal relation amongelements. Thus, it is the communica
ble form rather than the private matter of sensation which is adapted to
the harmony of our faculties in such a way that its contemplation can
elicit the aesthetic response. It is worth considering the relation of this
to Kant's distinction between form and matter in the first Critique-.
^ Guyet, Ka«t and thi Experience ofEnedom,28.
" Kemal, Kant and Fine Art, 167. See also CJ 34.
" Kant vacillates in several passages (CJ 14, 51) on whether color can contribute to perceptual
form. The indecision appears to rest on whether colors can be characterized as "vibrations in the
ether" and thus on whether they comprise a temporal arrangement of elements. There are
conflicting opinions on the extent and nature of Kant's commitment in this regard. Theodore
Uehling, in his The Notion of Form in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (Paris: Mouton, 1971),
maintains that Kant actually did interpret colors as beautiful plays of sensation (26). Donald
Crawford inclines to the opposite view that Kant regarded colors as simple sensations: Kant's
Aesthetic Theory, 109.
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"While the matter of appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form
must lie ready for sensations aprioriin the mind."'' Spatial and temporal
form are conditions on the possibility of experience.'® It is arguable that
Kant's claim that the common sense "in its reflection, takes account {a
priori) of the mode of representation of all other men" (CJ 40) is related
to the preceding, as are his claims that our "abstracting from the
limitations which contingently attach to our judgment.. .is brought
about by.. .having respect to the formal peculiarities of our representa
tion or representative state" {CJ 40).
Hume makes an explicit distinction between the objects and causes
of passions allied with moral sentiment, and a few aspects of his
account are not dissimilar to that of Kant, though some discussion is
required to establish this. The less complicated analysis of objects of
our moral approval or disapproval will be initially addressed. These
objects, provided we inform our understanding of them by considering
Hume's treatment of the indirect passions, are determined "not only by
a natural but also by an original property." Original properties "are such
as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolved into no
other" (T 2.1.3). It is "absolutely impossible, from the primary
constitution of the mind," that a passion like pride could take an object
other than the self (T2.1.5). Thus, given Hume'saccount of the indirect
passions, the objects of moral approbation arid disapprobation are
necessarily people (including ourselves, given emotions like shame and
guilt)."
The case of the causes of moral sentiments is more complex, if we
continue to consider them in light of Hume's discussion of the
passions. The analysis of pride and humility affords the greatest detail,
and can provide a template in terms of which other responses can be

" Iminanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, translator (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1929), B34-35.
" It is interesting to note here MichaelJ. Cholbi's claim that the inability of the understanding to
subsume the manifold of intuition under a concept (he would call this the "inarticulateness" of
the understanding) can be accounted for by its inability to deploy the pure concepts of the Critique
of Pure Reason to aesthetic judgment. In "Judgments of Aesthetic Experience," Eidos 12 (1995):
5-25.
" There is considerable disagreement about whether Hume regards this connection between
object and passion as a necessary or contingent one. Walter Brand, for instance, argues for a
logical relation in Hume's Theoty of MoralJudgment, 102. Ardal maintains that Hume (incorrectly, as
per Ardal) believed the relation between pride and its object to be contingent: Passion and Value,
23.
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considered. It is absurd, says Hume, to imagine that every particular
event or thing which does or can give rise to such sentiments is in fact
adapted by nature to do so, "instead of adapting itself to the passion by
partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind"
(T2.1.3). We must conclude, Hume continues, "that there are some one
or more circumstances common to all...[causes of an indirect
passion].. .on which their efficacy depends" (T2.1.3). So the causes of
the sentiments involve those qualities which are, as per the analyses
given earlier in this paper, thought to be instantiated in something
affiliated with the object of the emotion. The cause of the passion, an
idea or belief, is also the cause of a sensation of pain or pleasure (T
2.1.5). This sensation seems intimately connected to the quality which
the thought ascribes to a subject (which must be something related to
or associated with the object of the emotion). That is, the quality is
considered (to use Hume's terminology) agreeable or disagreeable
insofar as pleasure or pain are produced in the agent.
In speaking of pride in the ownership of a Taj Mahal-like domicile,
Hume indicates that "the quality [beauty is used here as an example of
an agreeable quality] which operates on the passion [pride], produces
separately an impression resembling it [pleasure]; the subject [a house]
to which the quality adheres [that is, beautiful house], is related to self
[that is, beautiful house], the object of the passion: No wonder the
whole cause, consisting of a quality and a subject, does so unavoidably
give rise to the passion" (T 2.1.5). It would appear that the circum
stances common to all the qualities that the belief which causes the
emotion concerns are that they are pain- or pleasure-producing.
When Hume more briefly considers the question of what the
multifarious causes of love and hatred may havein common, he invokes
his account of pride and humility to expedite the analysis, and maintains
that a similar approach may be employed in determining their causes,
provided it is kept in mind that the object of love and hatred is a
thinking being other than the self. "Any harm or uneasiness has a
natural tendency to excite our hatred," according to Hume. Once
animosity has been roused, "we seek for reasons upon which we may
justify and establish the passion. Here the idea of injury produces not
the passion, but arises from it" (T 2.2.3). This suggests, provided the
term "injury" can be held to have normative overtones, that the idea of
a harmful or pain-inflicting action (even when it's not inflicted on us)
can cause hatred of the actor (and a painful sensation in ourselves).
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which in turn leads to a negative moral judgment concerning that
individual.
The harm in question can be described as a disagreeable quality
precisely because its contemplation is painful, perhaps because
sympathy inclines us toward the adoption of a point of vantage from
which we imagine that harm as a harm to ourselves. Morality is
systematized insofar as the common point of view is adopted, and this
would presumably take into account the question of which qualities can
be taken to produce pain or pleasure
independent of particular
personal interests and predilections, a question answerable from the
point of vantage whose adoption sympathy requires.
There is no clear parallel to the Kantian conception of form here.
Still, Kant's distinction between form and matter—the communicability
and intersubjectivity of the former and the privacy of the latter—could
be regarded as loosely analogous to Hume's story about the invariant
features of the otherwise variable causes of approval and disapproval.
The focus in both is on what is shareable, on what is apprehensible in
common with one's fellows, rather than on what is exclusive to one's
particular apprehension.
Like Kant's aesthetic response, Hume's moral response begins with
observations of the world. Neither, however, assumes that the response
with which he is concerned involves determinate properties whose
instantiation can be deduced from a catalog of principles or itemized list
of necessary and sufficient conditions. The apprehension of beauty and
virtue depends both on universally accessible features of the world—on
perceptual form; on pleasure or pain with the experience of which it is
possible to identify—and on common features of our own constitu
tions, on the jvof in which those features of the world are apprehended.
Genuine aesthetic and moral responses further depend on the adoption
of an impartial or disinterested point of vantage, a perspective uninflu
enced by purely private considerations and hence accessible to and
achievable by others.

